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Epistemic Horizons and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
Jochen Szangolies, ∗
In-principle restrictions on the amount of information that can be gathered about a system have
been proposed as a foundational principle in several recent reconstructions of the formalism of
quantum mechanics. However, it seems unclear precisely why one should be thus restricted. We
investigate the notion of paradoxical self-reference as a possible origin of such epistemic horizons by
means of a fixed-point theorem in Cartesian closed categories due to F. W. Lawvere that illuminates
and unifies the different perspectives on self-reference.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Why the Quantum?’ is one of John Wheeler’s ‘Really
Big Questions’ [1], and possibly the one that has received
the most attention in print. It invites looking at quantum
mechanics not from an interpretive, but rather, from a
reconstructive point of view: what, exactly, is the reason
that nature is described by quantum mechanical laws?
Several authors have interpreted this question as ask-
ing for a foundational principle, that is, a short (and
ideally, intuitive and compelling) statement whose truth
implies the necessity of the quantum formalism. Special
relativity has such a principle in the invariant speed of
light; general relativity has it in the equivalence prin-
ciple. But for quantum mechanics, such a foundation
seems absent.
In recent years, however, a popular candidate that has
been advanced is an epistemic horizon of some sort. By
an epistemic horizon, I mean a fundamental limit to the
knowledge available about a system to any conceivable
observer. Grinbaum [2] identifies two basic principles
as common across several different approaches towards
a first-principles reconstruction of quantum mechanics,
due to Rovelli [3], Brukner and Zeilinger [4], and Fuchs
[5]. Similar principles are at work in the reconstructions
due to Masanes et al. [6] and Ho¨hner and Wever [7]. Fi-
nally, an early example is provided by von Weizsa¨cker’s
reconstruction of quantum theory in terms of what he
calls ‘ur-alternatives’ (where ‘ur’ means, roughly, primi-
tive or primordial) [8].
These two principles can be summarised as:
(1) Finiteness assumption: There is a finite maximum
of information that can be obtained about any
given system.
(2) Assumption of additional information: It is always
possible to acquire new information about any sys-
tem.
At first blush, the two assumptions above appear to
be contradictory: if the state of the system is maximally
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known, no further information can in principle be ob-
tained anymore. That this is not so is demonstrated by
a related, but distinct approach due to Spekkens [9], who
proposes a ‘toy theory’, i.e. a theory capable of repro-
ducing some, but not all, of the phenomena of quantum
mechanics, based on the knowledge balance principle:
“If one has maximal knowledge, then for
every system, at every time, the amount of
knowledge one possesses about the ontic state
of the system at that time must equal the
amount of knowledge one lacks.”
The toy theory serves as a useful means of illustrating
the precise role epistemic horizons play regarding those
phenomena that are usually considered to be distinctly
‘quantum’, including entanglement, complementary mea-
surements, teleportation, interference, and the impossi-
bility of cloning an arbitrary state. It is therefore in-
structive to take a look at the way these phenomena are
produced in the toy theory.
First, an elementary system in the toy theory, called
a ‘toy bit’, is specified by two bits of information—
however, due to the knowledge balance principle, only
one of them can be known at any given time. The toy
bit thus has four possible states, denoted t1, t2, t3 and t4,
and maximal achievable knowledge of its state suffices to
‘localize’ it within any two-element subset of the state
space. That is, there are six toy bit states of maximum
knowledge, {t1, t2}, {t2, t3}, {t1, t3}, {t2, t4}, {t1, t4},
{t3, t4}, and one single state of less-than-maximal knowl-
edge, here equivalent to the state of complete ignorance
{t1, t2, t3, t4}. In order to gauge the importance of the
epistemic horizon in this theory, we will have a brief look
at the phenomenon of complementarity.
Measurements in the toy theory are such that they dis-
tinguish between two disjunct subsets of the state space.
Thus, they can be considered to be the three {0, 1}-
valued functions specified in Table I.
As the indices suggest, these can be considered to be
the analogues of the three mutually orthogonal measure-
ment directions on a qubit. This means that the state
space of a toybit is an octahedron, with the six maximal
2TABLE I: Measurements in Spekkens’ toy theory.
t1 t2 t3 t4
mz 1 1 0 0
mx 1 0 1 0
my 1 0 0 1
knowledge states on the vertices, and the single max-
imally mixed state at the center, providing a discrete
analogue to the Bloch ball.
Let us now assume we perform successive measure-
ments of mz and mx. Let the outcome of the first mea-
surement be 1. Then, it is clear that the outcome of the
second measurement is not determined: perfect knowl-
edge of the outcome of the mz measurement entails ig-
norance of the mx outcome.
However, let the outcome of the second mx measure-
ment now likewise be 1. Since the only state compatible
with both outcomes is t1, we would be able to deduce,
in conflict with the knowledge balance principle, that the
state of the toy bit now is t1. To prevent this, the state
must be changed after the second measurement, in such a
way as to be not necessarily compatible with mz(t) = 1
anymore, but still with mx(t) = 1 (as otherwise, one
could hardly speak of measurement). A re-measurement
ofmz will then again equiprobably yield either of its out-
comes: mz and mx are complementary.
The toy theory hence possesses the feature of novel in-
formation (albeit a finite amount) always being available,
despite having maximal information about the system—
thus showing that the two principles are not contradic-
tory, but are instead responsible for the emergence of
many non-trivial analogues of quantum effects.
This situation is in fact not unlike that of an actual
horizon: we only ever see a small section of the Earth’s
surface, due to its curvature. Attempting to move closer
to the boundary of our knowledge—the horizon—results
in novel features of the landscape being revealed, at the
cost of losing sight of what we left behind. Hence, there
is a maximum of information about the Earth’s surface
available to us, yet we can gather novel information at
will.
As we have seen, quantum-like features flow rela-
tively immediately from these epistemically restrictive
approaches. An intuitive reason for this is that a limit on
the information obtainable from a system precludes it be-
ing exactly localizable in phase space (or some more gen-
eral state space): there will be a minimum phase space
volume, within which the system cannot be further lo-
calized. As Rovelli notes [3], this limitation already in-
troduces the constant ~ into the description: this mini-
mum volume will have dimensions of (kgm2s−1)3n for a
system composed of n particles, implying the existence
of a constant of maximum localizability with dimensions
kgm2s−1, i.e. ~. This also provides an intuitive reason
for the uncertainty relations.
The existence of such a minimum phase-space vol-
ume deforms the (classical) algebra of functions on phase
space into the non-commutative Moyal algebra, which is
in one-to-one correspondence with the algebra of oper-
ators on Hilbert space in the traditional formulation of
quantum mechanics. This yields the basis for the so-
called deformation quantization (for a review, see e.g.
[10]).
A further observation made by Grinbaum ([11]) is the
fact that imposing a limit on the information available
about a system imposes a logical calculus similar to the
quantum logic of Birkhoff and Neumann (given by an
orthomodular lattice) [12].
This brief review demonstrates that epistemic horizons
are a promising candidate for a foundational principle of
quantum mechanics, explaining at least some of its prop-
erties in a natural way. Our aim in this article is then
to investigate a possible origin for such restrictions. Our
first cue towards this end is the appearance of random-
ness in quantum mechanics. There is a close connection
between the principles (1) and (2) and the notion of ran-
domness: if the state of a system is maximally known
according to (1), any additional information (2) assures
us can always be acquired cannot be reducible to this
prior knowledge, and hence, must be random.
However, in mathematics, randomness is closely tied to
undecidability—the existence of propositions that cannot
be decided within a given axiomatic framework [13].
Thus, in Sec. II we will consider the connection be-
tween undecidability and randomness in more detail,
focusing on some approaches towards applying self-
referential arguments to physical systems. Afterwards,
in Sec. III, we will consider physical self-reference in a
novel setting, which we will use to establish the first of
our main results, proving that there exists no specifica-
tion of a system’s state such that the outcomes of all fur-
ther experiments are deducible from it. This gives a con-
crete foundation for the second principle above, namely,
that new information about a system can always be ac-
quired. In the following Sec. IV, using an argument from
algorithmic information theory, our second main result
is that a given system can only be localized to a finite
degree of accuracy within its state space, likewise justi-
fying the principle of maximum information, and estab-
lishing the necessity of epistemic horizons. In Section V,
we conclude and give an outlook towards future research
extending the present work.
II. SELF-REFERENCE IN PHYSICS
On most standard accounts, quantum mechanical mea-
surement produces outcomes that may be random—and
moreover, whose randomness is both irreducible and gen-
uine. That is, the randomness is neither due to our ig-
norance about the system, nor is it a product of under-
lying deterministic (perhaps chaotic) processes. Indeed,
Yurtsever has argued that quantum mechanical random-
ness must be genuine—otherwise, for a sufficiently long
3measurement sequence, any correlations present in pseu-
dorandom data would allow nonlocal signalling between
spacelike separated agents [14]. Likewise, Bendersky et
al. [15] show that any deterministic theory reproducing
the predictions of quantum mechanics must be noncom-
putable, or else, lead to exploitable signaling.
A similar conclusion is reached by Calude and Svozil
[16], who demonstrate that the value indefiniteness (the
nonexistence of simultaneous definite values for all ob-
servables) suggested by the Kochen-Specker theorem [17]
and related results implies the incomputability of quan-
tum randomness.
This has an immediate, but perhaps underappreciated,
corollary: namely, no algorithmic process can account for
all measurements outcomes—some measurements, hence,
must be algorithmically undecidable. In the words of
Feynman [18]:
“It is impossible to represent the results of
quantum mechanics with a classical universal
device.”
Of special interest here is a result due to Edis ([19]),
who proves that every incomputable function can be rep-
resented by a finite algorithm augmented by an infinite
lookup table of random bits. Hence, every such function
can be decomposed into an algorithmic and a random
part. This suggests that systems behaving according to
a noncomputable law show a behavior that is algorithmic,
interspersed with random events—which strongly recalls
the two-tiered dynamics familiar from quantum theory.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm augmented with infinite
random data.
1: procedure u(n)
2: if nmod3 6= 0 then
return n2
3: else
return ρ(n)
4: end if
5: end procedure
6:
7: ρ← 1101110101011010 . . .
Thus, as in the example, a noncomputable law might
yield random data under certain conditions, and other-
wise work according to a deterministic law (the above
algorithm computes the square of all inputs not divisible
by three, and returns a random bit otherwise). Observa-
tion of the output of this ‘algorithm’ then allows one to
deduce the deterministic part, while leaving the rest to
appear random.
This remark deserves some further clarification. Due
to the fact that we observe any physical system only for
a finite time, it is trivially the case that there exists a
Turing machine, or algorithm, replicating its behavior.
However, in general, the ‘law’ thus found will not be sig-
nificantly less complex than the behavior itself, in the
same way that an algorithm reproducing a finite random
number will be of a length approximately equal to that
number (if the number is x, the algorithm might simply
be ‘print x’). Furthermore, it will not allow any predic-
tion of the future behavior of the system.
Decomposing the system’s behavior into an algorith-
mic and a random part might then afford at least partial
compression of the system’s behavior, and allow predic-
tion in at least a subset of cases. Consequently, an ob-
server might well arrive at such a ‘composite’ description
for a system behaving according to a noncomputable law.
There exists another way to highlight the deep math-
ematical connection between randomness and undecid-
ability. Consider the following construction, known as
Chaitin’s constant [20]:
ΩU =
∑
x:U(x) halts
2−|x|. (1)
Here, U is a given (universal) Turing machine, with
the special property that all valid programs for U self-
terminate, that is, if x is a valid program, there is no x′
such that it extends x and is also a valid program. Pro-
grams x can be thought of as being represented by bit
strings; |x| then denotes their length in bits. Thus, ΩU
yields the probability that U halts, given a random pro-
gram, and is hence also referred to as halting probability.
Knowledge of the first n bits of the halting probability
of U entails being able to solve the halting problem for
U for all programs of length n [20]: one simply runs all
programs of length up to n bits in parallel, and adds the
lengths of those that have halted to the estimate for ΩU ;
once this estimate matches the first n bits, the programs
that have not yet halted will never halt. Due to the re-
cursive insolubility of the halting problem [21], ΩU must
be uncomputable, and thus, the values of each of its bits
represent undecidable propositions.
Furthermore, ΩU must be a random number; in fact, it
can be shown that any recursively enumerable number—
a number that is the limit of a computable, increasing
series of rational numbers—that is random is a halt-
ing probability [22]. Hence, instances of randomness in
mathematics are closely tied to undecidable propositions,
and wherever we find randomness, we should look for un-
decidability at its core.
For a more in-depth look at the connections between
randomness and undecidability, as well as their implica-
tions for physics, see the books by Svozil [23, 24].
At the outset, it may not be immediately clear how
the notion of undecidability applies to physical systems.
The fact that for any given axiom system (of sufficient
strength), there exist propositions that the system cannot
decide was first pointed out by Go¨del [25], in a paper that
famously overturned Hilbert’s hope of finding a single
axiom system encompassing all of mathematics. Shortly
thereafter, Turing [21] proposed what is to this day the
canonical example of an undecidable problem, namely,
the question of whether a given algorithm ever halts and
produces an output.
4Both of these results apply strictly in the formal setting
of mathematical logic. However, they essentially rely on
the notion of self-reference: Go¨del’s theorem applies to
all formal systems capable of axiomatizing (a certain frac-
tion of) number theory, since such theories are capable of
formalizing statements about themselves, while Turing’s
proof relies on constructing a program capable of solving
its own halting problem. Both essentially frame limita-
tions by showing the paradoxical consequences of certain
self-referential constructions: a theorem that is provable
if and only if it is not, or a program that halts if and
only if it fails to. In this way, paradoxical self-reference
produces epistemic horizons in the form of undecidable
propositions. However, self-reference is not limited to the
setting of mathematical logic; thus, analogues to these
phenomena may be found in other domains.
Indeed, in his proof, Turing introduced one of the first
general formalizations of what it means to compute a
function, via the notion of what he called a-machines
(now usually called Turing machines in his honor). This
ties the formal argumentation to a concrete system that
can, in principle, be instantiated physically—and indeed,
modern-day computers, if outfitted with an unbounded
supply of data storage, are equivalent to Turing machines
in their computational power. Thus, the question of
whether a given algorithm ever halts can be reformu-
lated as a question of whether a computer ever reaches
a certain pre-defined halting state, hence translating the
formal question to a question about the dynamical evo-
lution of a concrete physical system (which thus must be
undecidable).
There exists a broad analogy between the time-
evolution of physical systems, the act of deriving the-
orems in formal systems, and computation: in each case,
we start of with some initial information—the formal sys-
tem’s axioms, the initial state of the physical system, or
the program—and apply a transformation in order to de-
rive new information: a new theorem, the state of the
system at a point in the future, or the computation’s
output.
Indeed, we benefit from this analogy every day: thanks
to it, we may view certain physical system as performing
computations. Likewise, for any formal system, there ex-
ists a Turing machine that enumerates its theorems; more
generally, the equivalence between proofs and programs
is established via the Curry-Howard correspondence [26].
A distinction between these three domains might seem
to be the fact that theorem-deriving and computation
may be information-lossy: the output of a computation
does not necessarily allow the unique reconstruction of its
initial data, and a theorem may not imply the full set of
axioms of a formal system. Conversely, a physical system
evolves in an information-preserving way, such that the
dynamics may be reversed to recover the initial state.
However, this distinction is ultimately superficial: we
might make computation information-preserving by ex-
clusively considering reversible computation (which has
the same power as ordinary computation [27]), or we
might restrict our attention to only a part of a physical
system, integrating out certain degrees of freedom, to im-
plement information loss. On the side of formal systems,
the derivation of a theorem—being at each step reducible
to pure syntactical manipulations—does not introduce
additional information, but uncovers implications of the
axioms. This is the origin of Chaitin’s principle [28], stat-
ing roughly that it is impossible to derive a theorem from
a set of axioms if it is more complex than those atoms.
In fact, it is exactly this conservation of information
that makes the connection between the three domains
meaningful: we may consider the processes of computa-
tion, derivation and physical evolution as acting on the
information contained in the initial data to ‘unpack’ the
final data.
Both the limitations on computation and logical
derivation can be considered to stem from this conser-
vation of information: Chaitin’s principle implies that
certain theorems cannot be derived from a set of ax-
ioms, and Edis’ result shows that if we were to augment
a Turing machine with a source of new information in the
form of an infinite random bit string, it would be possi-
ble to ‘compute’ uncomputable functions. Consequently,
it seems natural to investigate whether there is a similar
epistemic horizon in the domain of physics.
TABLE II: Correspondence between computation, formal sys-
tems, and physics.
Computation Formal Systems Physics
initial data: program / input axioms initial state
process: computation derivation dynamics
final data: output theorem final state
epistemic horizon: uncomputability incompleteness ?
A. Prior Work
With the possibility of real-word instantiations of self-
reference given by the correspondence in Table II, the
application of undecidability results to physical systems
becomes feasible. In this section, we provide a brief (and
partial) overview of results obtained by exploiting this
connection.
Recently, Cubitt et al. [29] have used this
correspondence—between the ground state configuration
of a spin system and the problem of tiling the plane with
tiles whose edges are colored, such that the same colors
meet, which is known to be undecidable [30]—to show
that, in general, the question of whether this ground state
possesses an energy gap is undecidable (see also [31, 32]).
Since this energy gap is in principle a measurable quan-
tity, the outcome of this measurement is undecidable.
Likewise, Eisert et al. [33] have shown by a reduc-
tion to the undecidable matrix mortality problem—which
5asks whether one can multiply matrices from a given set,
such as to obtain the zero matrix—that the question of
whether a certain outcome in a sequence of Stern-Gerlach
measurements ever occurs is undecidable.
In fact, the application of self-referential constructions
to physical systems has a long history. Popper, in 1950,
was one of the earliest to consider this connection [34],
giving an argument establishing that no physical system
can ever perfectly predict its own behaviour. In 1964,
Rothstein considered a Maxwell’s-demon type of setup,
proposing an intrinsic limit on the accuracy of measure-
ments that can be performed [35].
A more daring proposal is what one might call the
‘Go¨delian hunch’: the idea that the origin of the pecu-
liarities surrounding quantum theory lie in phenomena
related, or at least similar, to that of incompleteness in
formal systems.
There is a potential for misunderstanding here, that
has at times given rise to misguided criticism of the gen-
eral idea: it is not proposed that quantum indeterminacy
is due, in any direct sense, to Go¨del’s theorem. The in-
completeness theorem applies to formal systems capable
of axiomatizing a certain fragment of arithmetic, not to
physical systems. Rather, the idea is that similar phe-
nomena in the domain of physics, perhaps working on
related principles, might be foundational to quantum me-
chanics in one way or another.
This idea was given an early formulation by Wheeler
himself: in unpublished notes to a discussion held with,
among others, Roger Penrose and Simon Kochen, he
identifies the point of origin of the ‘quantum principle’
as the undecidable propositions of mathematical logic.
(The full text of this note is reprinted in the appendix of
Ref. [36]; a scanned pdf copy can be found at the URL
in Ref. [37].) However, in an oft-quoted story, Wheeler
reports being thrown out of Go¨del’s office by the latter
after confronting him with the suggestion of a connec-
tion between the incompleteness theorems and quantum
mechanics (see e. g. Ref. [38]).
Along similar lines, Dalla Chiara in 1977 [39] consid-
ered the importance of self-reference for the quantum
measurement problem. Continuing this investigation,
but extending it to the classical domain, in 1995 Breuer
proved [40] that no observer can distinguish all the states
of a system that includes them as a proper part, which he
explicitly connected to the quantum measurement prob-
lem in 1999 [41]. Within a similar framework, Aerts es-
tablished in 2005 [42] that there are properties pertaining
to the observer that they cannot perfectly observe.
Yet more directly, Zwick [43] has proposed an anal-
ogy between quantum measurement and paradoxical self-
reference, using a discretized version of the quantum for-
malism that models quantum evolution as a succession
of wave functions—analogous to steps of a derivation—
with the result of a measurement taking the role of an
undecidable proposition. A related theme was pursued
by Peres and Zurek [44], who argue that “[quantum the-
ory’s] inability to completely describe the measurement
process appears to be not a flaw of the theory but a logi-
cal necessity which is analogous to Go¨del’s undecidability
theorem [emphasis in the original]”.
The proposal by Brukner [45] and Paterek et al. [46]
comes very close to realizing the ‘Go¨delian hunch’. Es-
sentially, they use the correspondence shown in Table II
to embed a simple set of axioms within the initial state
of a quantum system, and associate a proposition with a
measurement, which yields random results if and only if
that proposition is independent from the axioms.
This bears a remarkable resemblance to Spekkens’
knowledge balance principle: the information related to
the measurement outcome cannot be derived from the ax-
ioms; yet, an outcome is produced, with the consequence
that the state is changed (the ‘collapse’ of the wave func-
tion) such that the post-measurement state contains the
same amount of information as the initial state.
They indeed relate their observations to Chaitin’s al-
gorithmic information theory-based version of Go¨del’s in-
completeness theorem, stating informally that no theo-
rem can be derived from a set of axioms if it contains
more information than them, as quantified via an appro-
priate measure [47]. However, they note explicitly that
their axiom systems do not meet the formal requirements
for the applicability of Go¨del’s theorem, being unable to
capture the required features of arithmetic, and thus, are
completable.
Finally, Calude and Stay [48] establish a formal uncer-
tainty principle between the value of a random real num-
ber and the (knowledge of the) length of the shortest pro-
gram computing it that is equivalent to Chaitin’s incom-
pleteness theorem, and show that these uncertainties can
be thought of as standard deviations of canonically con-
jugate measurable quantities for certain physically im-
plemented (quantum-) computations. Nevertheless, the
result remains partial: it is far from clear whether any in-
stance of uncertainty in quantum mechanics can be sim-
ilarly related to mathematical undecidability.
B. Preliminaries
These results point to the possibility of an intrigu-
ing connection between fundamental features of quan-
tum mechanics and the phenomena of paradoxical self-
reference. However, they remain partial. In our inves-
tigation, we will pursue the same path, and study, from
a broad vantage point, the implications of self-reference
for physical theories in general.
This angle of attack is justified by the fact that any uni-
versal theory—that is, any theory whose domain of valid-
ity is supposed to cover all physical systems indiscrimi-
nately, in particular, both observers and the systems they
observe—must contain self-referential elements: it must
describe both the properties of a given object system, as
well as an observer’s knowledge about these properties
(which must, after all, be stored in the observer’s state
in some way). Hence, an investigation into the effects of
6such self-reference seems a natural avenue of inquiry.
First, we will introduce some notation. The mathemat-
ical representative of a physical system S is its state space
ΣS . In a sense to be clarified below, the state space can
be considered to be a collection of all the possible ways
for a physical system to be, defining its possible prop-
erties. The elements of the state space are the system’s
states s ∈ ΣS , whose exact nature we will leave open for
the time being.
Using the notion of state space, a property pi of a sys-
tem S is taken to be an arbitrary subset of ΣS . If the
system’s state s is an element of a given pi, s ∈ pi ⊂ ΣS ,
we say that it possesses the corresponding property. A
physical system could, for instance, have a liquid and a
solid phase. Then, whether the system is liquid is de-
cided based on whether its current state is in the set of
all states corresponding to the liquid phase.
Although this framework applies in more general cases,
it may be useful to think of ΣS as analogous to a system’s
phase space: a state is then given by the point x = (p, q),
where p and q are respectively the generalized momenta
and coordinates of the system. As an example, consider
the property ‘having energy less than E0’, which corre-
sponds to the set piE0 = {x|H(x) < E0}, where H is the
Hamiltonian function of the system.
Under set inclusion as ordering relation, the subsets of
ΣS form a lattice, which yields a calculus that can be
used to reason about properties of the system. Negation
is given by taking the set-theoretic complement ⊥, and
subset intersection and union correspond, respectively, to
the logical ‘and’ (∧) and ‘or’ (∨). Under complementa-
tion, any property pi is mapped to a property pi⊥, such
that s possesses pi⊥ whenever it does not possess pi. For a
classical mechanical system, this lattice will be Boolean,
ensuring that we can reason about its properties using
familiar classical logic.
By means of this calculus, properties can be combined
logically. Thus, if some system e.g. has properties pi1
and pi2, it also possesses the property pi12 = pi1 ∧ pi2.
Likewise, properties can imply one another: a property
pi1 implies pi2 if it is its subset, and thus, for any state
s, s ∈ pi1 → s ∈ pi2. Hence, a full specification of all
properties of a given system need not be an exhaustive
list, but rather, just some minimal set of properties such
that all further properties can be derived from it. A
system’s state is uniquely determined by its properties:
any singleton set can be understood as the intersection
of sets containing it. Therefore, we can think of the state
of a system equivalently as being given by the list of
properties the system possesses in that state.
For each property pi, we stipulate that there exists a
measurement mpi that determines whether S possesses
pi. That is, measurements are maps m : S → {0, 1}
yielding 1 if S has property pi, and 0 if it does not have
property pi. The outcome of a measurement for some
property pi is then given by the characteristic function
associated to that property. We only consider dichotomic
measurements; however, this does not represent a restric-
tion, since any measurement M with multiple outcomes
o1, o2, . . . can always be broken down into dichotomic
measurements testing for the properties ‘the value of M
is o1’, ‘the value of M is o2’, and so on. For each mea-
surementm, there exists an orthogonal measurement m⊥
corresponding to measuring the property pi⊥, i.e. the
property corresponding to the complementary subset of
pi on the state space ΣS .
Above, the state of a system was defined as a list of
all the properties a system may possess in that state. As
these properties are in one-to-one correspondence with
the possible measurements on a system, this implies that
this notion of state is one in which every measurable
property possesses a definite value. Such a notion of state
is sometimes called ontic [9], in opposition to an epis-
temic state, which can be viewed as a state of knowledge
about the properties of a system—consider the distinc-
tion between a phase-space point (ontic) and a Liouville
distribution (epistemic). Unless otherwise noted, in the
following, a state will always refer to such a complete
specification of properties. A quantum state, which does
not specify definite values of certain measurable proper-
ties, thus does not fall under this notion of state.
A measurement sequence µ is an ordered collection of
measurements, µ = (m1,m2,m3, . . .). A measurement
sequence µ, applied to a state s of S yields an outcome
sequence µ(s). Since we are only concerned with di-
chotomic measurements, this sequence will be a string
of bits, such that the nth bit indicates whether the sys-
tem possesses property pin.
For a classical system, we expect that it is possible to
compute the outcomes of every measurement, given suf-
ficient knowledge about the state of the system. This
now allows us to state the following criterion of classi-
cality: a system S is classical, if it is possible to obtain
knowledge of the state s of S such that the outcomes of
all further measurements performed on S are derivable
from this knowledge, that is, if there exists a measure-
ment sequence such that its outcomes suffice to fix the
outcomes of all further measurements. Such a measure-
ment sequence may be called a ‘canonical measurement
sequence’.
The purpose of this criterion is simply to capture, in
a sufficiently precise way, our intuition that the state of
a classical system can be completely known in all of its
properties. This is exactly what is denied by the conjunc-
tion of postulates (1) and (2) above: accepting these, a
state can never be precisely known, and it will always
be possible to perform tests whose outcomes cannot be
predicted based on pre-existing knowledge.
To elucidate this notation, we will have another look at
the toy theory. The state space ΣT of a toybit T is simply
the set ΣT = {t1, t2, t3, t4}. Above, we have considered
three properties that a toy bit can have, which we may
denote pix, piy and piz. Together with their complements,
7these properties thus correspond to the following sets:
{t1, t2} = pix; {t3, t4} = pi⊥x
{t1, t3} = piy; {t2, t4} = pi⊥y
{t1, t4} = piz ; {t2, t3} = pi⊥z
The measurements corresponding to these properties
are simply the denoted mx, my, and mz . Any two of
these measurements suffice to infer the outcome of the
third, and thus, to fix the entire state. Thus, a possible
canonical measurement sequence for the toy bit is
µ = (mx,m
⊥
z ). (2)
This example also shows that there may be more than
one canonical measurement sequence for a given system,
which roughly translates to the possibility of different
basis expansions of a given state.
However, by the knowledge balance principle, the state
can never be known exactly; in fact, only one of two
necessary properties can be known at any given time.
In the toy theory, then, our condition for classical-
ity would be fulfilled, if we could obtain full knowledge
about the ontic state of the system: knowing e.g. that
mx(t) = 0 and my(t) = 1, we could immediately infer
that mz(t) = 0, since we know that the state of T must
be t3. If this is not the case, we are subject to an epis-
temic horizon: it is not possible to know everything that
would be necessary to completely describe the system.
With these notions in place, we thus proceed to es-
tablish our first main result, showing that not all infor-
mation about S can be obtained—more accurately, that
there does not exist a set of measurements of S such
that, if their outcomes are known, they suffice to derive
all further experimental outcomes on S.
III. THE UNCOMPUTABILITY OF
MEASUREMENT
Our argumentation in the following will make use of
the fixed point theorem due to F. W. Lawvere [49]. The
original setting of Lawvere’s theorem is that of Cartesian
closed categories (CCCs), with its most prominent mem-
ber being the category Set, whose objects are sets, and
whose morphisms are maps between them. Yanofsky [50]
provides an elementary introduction to Lawvere’s results
in the language of set theory.
Lawvere’s result essentially exhibits the ‘common sub-
structure’ behind many of the classical ‘paradoxes’ of
self-reference—Cantor’s proof of the uncountability of
the real numbers [51], Russell’s paradox that doomed
Fregean set theory by exhibiting the construction of a
‘set of all sets that do not contain themselves’ which con-
tains itsef exactly if it does not contain itself [52], Tarski’s
proof of the impossibility of defining a notion of truth in
the language of the same system that it pertains to [53],
Berry’s paradox [54], the undecidability of the halting
problem [21], and of course, and perhaps most famously,
the incompleteness theorems due to Go¨del [25].
A. The Existence of Undecidable Measurements
In the following, we will assume the correspondence
proposed in Table II: that is, physical evolutions corre-
spond to computable processes. In particular, we will
study the special case of measurement: acquiring infor-
mation about another system via, ideally, non-disturbing
interactions.
In classical mechanics, such measurements are possible
in principle: we are able to simply ‘read off’ information
about the properties of a system, without causing any
change in these properties.
Let us thus assume that there exists a computable pro-
cess associated with every measurement on a given sys-
tem. That is, for every measurement m there exists an
associated program p such that p enumerates the out-
comes of the measurement m on every possible state s of
S. There thus must exist an onto map between programs
and measurements.
We fix some enumeration for measurements mi, pro-
grams pj, and states sk, with i, j, k ∈ N. Since we are
assuming computational dynamics, there can only be de-
numerably many of each, as there only are denumerably
many Turing machines. We will now argue that it is
possible to construct a measurement mg such that there
exists an sn ∈ ΣS such that no pj generates mg(sn).
The argument will make use of the method from
Ref. [50]. We will explicitly construct a measurement
mg(sk), that is, a function mg : ΣS → {0, 1}, such that
it differs from the output for each pj for at least one sk.
There exists a function f(j, k) : N × N → {0, 1} such
that it is equal to the output of the jth program for the
kth state. Furthermore, we introduce the arbitrary map
α : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, and the map ∆ : N → N × N that
takes n ∈ N to the tuple (n, n) ∈ N× N. With these, we
construct g as the map that makes the following diagram
commute:
N× N {0, 1}
N {0, 1}
f
α∆
g
The map g constructed in this way then yields sequen-
tially values for a certain measurement, mg, if performed
on states of S, i.e. g(k) = mg(sk). If f yields the value
of every measurement applied to every state, then there
must be some n such that g(k) = f(n, k) for all states
sk. Choose now k = n and evaluate g(n):
8f(n, n) = g(n) (3)
= α(f(n, n))
The first equality is simply our stipulation that g
should encode some measurement, and that f(n, n) yields
the output of the nth program for the nth state. The
above then shows that the map α must have a fixed point
at f(n, n) for the construction to be consistent.
However, we are free in our choice of α, and conse-
quently, may choose the negation ¬(1) = 0, ¬(0) = 1.
But this clearly has no fixed point. But then, this means
that no f reproducing every measurement outcome can
exist; however, since f yields the outcome of any program
applied to any state, there must be some measurement
outcome that cannot be produced via a computation.
The above may be more clear if looked at in terms of
Table III.
TABLE III: Illustration of the fixed-point argument against
the possibility of computing every measurement in terms of a
diagonalization technique.
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 . . . sn . . .
m1 ← p1 (1) 0 1 1 1 . . . 1 . . .
m2 ← p2 1 (0) 1 0 0 0
m3 ← p3 0 1 (0) 0 0 1
m4 ← p4 1 0 0 (1) 1 1
m5 ← p5 0 0 0 1 (1) 0
...
...
. . .
...
mg ← pn 0 1 1 0 0 . . . (?) . . .
...
...
...
. . .
The leftmost column contains the programs pi and the
measurements they implement. The following columns
refer to the states sk of S. The table can be thought of
as the table of values of the function f : the first row yields
f(1, k), i.e. the values produced by the first program for
the states of S, the second row yields f(2, k), and so on.
Note that every row also corresponds to a set: the first
row corresponds to the set that includes s1, does not in-
clude s2, includes s3, etc. Every such assignment of val-
ues thus corresponds to a subset of ΣS , and as stipulated,
to every such set corresponds a measurement.
The measurement mg, and its associated set, is then
constructed by taking the values on the diagonal (that is,
the value the first program assigns to the first state, the
second program assigns to the second state, and so on),
and inverting them. Thus, we create a measurement that
differs from the values produced by the first program in
the value assignment to the first state, from the values
produced by the second program in the value assigned to
the second state, and so on, all down to the diagonal.
Assuming that there exists some program that pro-
duces the values of the measurement thus constructed
then yields a contradiction: the value assigned to the
state sn is 1, if and only if it is zero. Hence, no program
can produce the value of mg(sn).
What, however, happens if we perform the measure-
ment mg, and the system happens to be in state sn? If
the measurement produces the value 1, then it follows
that it must produce the value 0; if it produces the value
0, then it must produce the value 1. Do we then hover
in a state of indecision? Does the measurement simply
produce no result?
One might think that this provides a way out; how-
ever, it is easy to see that this is not the case. If we
allow a measurement to yield ‘no result’, then effectively
we have merely added a third outcome. But for three-
outcome measurements, a proof exactly analogous to the
above one could be constructed to again construct a mea-
surement yielding a contradictory outcome.
This is analogous to trying to solve the liar-paradox
by deciding that ‘this sentence is false’, is neither false
nor true, but meaningless. However, then, we can formu-
late ‘this sentence is false or meaningless’, which must
either be true, or not; but if it is true, then it is false or
meaningless, yet if it is false or meaningless, then it is
true.
Consequently, we must insist that the measurement
does, in fact, produce an outcome. But if this is the
case, then, since sn is incompatible with every outcome,
upon producing any outcome, the system cannot, in fact,
be in state sn. Hence, the measurement must produce a
change of state.
Furthermore, the system being in the state sn can nei-
ther be said to have the property pig associated to the
measurement mg, nor not to have it; yet measurement
will always produce a definite judgment. This situation
thus bears more than a passing resemblance to the phe-
nomenon of quantum superposition.
This may be compared to trying to build a computer
that is able to solve its own halting problem. Recall
that the proof of the recursive unsolvability of the halt-
ing problem includes the creation of a program that halts
if and only if it fails to halt—a contradiction. This is
sometimes claimed to make hypercomputation (in any
form) impossible; however, this is really only the case
for proposed systems capable of solving their own halt-
ing problem [55]. Thus, an oracle capable of solving the
halting problems for Turing machines, but not its own,
yields a consistent form of hypercomputation.
The above, however, resembles a device that is capa-
ble of solving its own halting problem: the function f
is computable, and thus, it is possible to compute the
value of f(n, n), and return the opposite. Hence, this
would yield an inconsistency, which can only be avoided
if the post-measurement state is different from sn. In
this sense, the looming inconsistency plays the role of
Spekkens’ ‘knowledge balance principle’.
Finally, note that we may view the above equivalently
9in an ‘epistemic’ way: instead of producing values via
measurement, we reinterpret the task as predicting values
that will be generated in measurement by computational
means. Then, too, we must conclude that there neces-
sarily exist measurements on certain states such that it
is impossible to computationally predict their outcome:
the criterion of classicality can never be fulfilled.
In seeming contradiction to the above result, there ex-
ist theories that do attribute definite values of properties
to quantum systems, nevertheless reproducing the full
array of quantum mechanical predictions, such as the de
Broglie-Bohm theory [56, 57]. However, the results of
Yurtsever [14], Bendersky et al. [15], and Calude and
Svozil [16] already imply that any theory capable of re-
producing quantum mechanics must be noncomputable.
Nevertheless, to any given particle, Bohmian mechan-
ics associates a full list of properties. In order to see how
this is consistent with the above results, it is instructive
to further elucidate how the value of each property is
arrived at.
Bohmian mechanics, in order to reproduce the predic-
tions of quantum mechanics, must be highly nonlocal.
The values of the properties of any single quantum sys-
tem thus depend on those of every other system. Fur-
thermore, Bohmian mechanics is highly sensitive to ini-
tial conditions. In order to reproduce the predictions of
quantum mechanics, the initial distribution of particles
must satisfy the Born rule; deviation from this ‘quantum
equilibrium’ entails the possibility of nonlocal signaling
[58].
Consequently, any randomness observed in the out-
comes of measurements in the Bohmian theory must de-
rive from the randomness in the initial conditions. In as
much as this is algorithmic randomness, so, too, must the
randomness of the initial configuration of particles be.
But then, it is easy to see why Bohmian mechanics is
not a counterexample to, but indeed, serves as an illus-
tration of the above result: due to nonlocality, any given
measurement outcome depends, in principle, on the full,
algorithmically random, initial conditions (rather than,
for instance, merely the configuration contained in the
past light cone of a given experiment). In this way, the
initial configuration acts as the infinite random ρ in Edis’
representation of uncomputable functions; any measure-
ment outcome is thus a function of both this initial ran-
dom data, and the deterministic algorithm given by the
guiding equation.
B. The Existence of Uncomputable Measurement
Sequences
In the preceding subsection, we saw that there is at
least one measurement such that, for some given state,
its outcome cannot be predicted by computable means
(and equivalently, cannot be produced by a computable
process).
However, this does not yet yield the sort of phenom-
ena known from quantum mechanics: in particular, it
still seems to be possible that there are states such that
every measurement performed on them is perfectly well
predictable.
In this section, we will demonstrate another, stronger
restriction: that for every state s, there exist measure-
ment sequences such that not all elements of these se-
quences can be produced by a computational process.
We will proceed in analogy to the previous section.
However, instead of measurements mi, we will now fo-
cus on measurement sequences µi, i ∈ N. Again, we
will suppose (for contradiction) that every measurement
sequence (more accurately, the outcome sequence associ-
ated with every measurement sequence for a given, fixed,
state s) can be generated by some program pj.
The argument will follow the same lines as the previous
one. We explicitly construct an outcome sequence, that
is, a function g : N → {0, 1} such that g(l) = ml(s),
where ml is the lth measurement in some measurement
sequence µ. Then, we will show that for the constructed
g, there exists some n, such that the value of g(n) cannot
be produced by any program pj .
As before, there is a function f : N× N→ {0, 1} such
that f(j, k) is the value of the kth measurement in the
measurement sequence µ, produced by the jth program
(throughout, we leave the state s of S fixed).
The map g is then constructed as above. Again, we
see that g(n), yielding the value of the nth measurement
of some measurement sequence µ, must differ from every
f(j, n): no program pj produces the value g(n) as the nth
measurement of the associated measurement sequence.
Nevertheless, g(n) corresponds to a valid measurement
on S: it is the nth measurement of the sequence of mea-
surements obtained by taking the first measurement of
the first measurement sequence, the second measurement
of the second measurement sequence, and so on, and per-
forming the orthogonal measurement in every case.
Thus, there exists a measurement sequence such that
its outcomes cannot be produced by any program pj .
Again, we may lay out the argument in a grid, as in
Table IV.
Each measurement sequence µi maps to a certain pro-
gram pj. We construct a new sequence of measurements
by taking the measurements yielding the outcomes along
the diagonal, and performing the orthogonal measure-
ments. The sequence of outcomes of these measurements
must be different from the outcomes obtained from µ1 in
the first element, from those obtained from µ2 in the sec-
ond, and so on; hence, no program suffices to derive every
measurement outcome produced by that measurement
sequence. In particular, trying to produce the measure-
ment outcome of mn produces a contradiction: it yields
0 if and only if it yields 1.
One might suppose that this phenomenon is, in some
sense, rare. However, this is not the case: we may re-
place the map ∆ with another, 〈β, Id〉 : N→ N× N that
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TABLE IV: Illustration of the fixed-point argument against
the possibility of computing every measurement sequence in
terms of a diagonalization technique.
m1, i m2, i m3, i m4, i m5, i . . . mn, i . . .
µ1(s)← p1 (1) 0 [1] 1 1 . . . 1 . . .
µ2(s)← p2 [1] (0) 1 0 0 0
µ3(s)← p3 0 1 (0) 0 [0] 1
µ4(s)← p4 1 [0] 0 (1) 1 1
µ5(s)← p5 0 0 0 [1] (1) 0
...
...
. . .
...
µg(s)← pn 0 1 1 0 0 . . . (?) . . .
...
...
...
. . .
µg′(s)← pβ(n) 0 1 0 0 1 . . . . . . . . .
takes any n to (β(n), n) where β is an arbitrary bijection
from N to itself. Each choice of β allows us to con-
struct g′ such that µg′ must differ from any computable
µ, illustrated in Table IV by using the values in square
brackets, and inverting them. But the set of all β (the
symmetric group over N) has the cardinality of the pow-
erset of N, i.e. 2|N| [59]. Since there are only countably
many programs pi, this means that almost all µ must be
uncomputable. Consequently, the computable measure-
ment sequences form a subset of measure zero.
This proof has the form of Richard’s paradox [60]. This
paradox involves describing real numbers using natural
language. There are some sentences that describe real
numbers in the interval [0, 1], such as ‘the number whose
decimal expansion is given by the concatenation of all
elements of the Fibonacci sequence’. Call these Richard
sentences, and the numbers they define Richard numbers.
We can bring them into an ordering, such that we can
uniquely refer to ‘the nth digit of the number defined by
the mth Richard sentence’. Now, consider ‘the number
such that its nth digit is equal to 9 minus the nth digit
of the nth Richard number’. Clearly, this is an English
sentence describing a real number between 0 and 1. How-
ever, it cannot be in the previous enumeration: it differs
from the first Richard number in the first digit, from the
second in the second digit, and so on.
In our argument, measurement sequences are ‘named’
by programs enumerating their outcomes, and this nam-
ing is used to construct a measurement sequence (via its
outcome sequence) that cannot be named by—i.e. ex-
tracted from—any program, in the same way that we
constructed a real number not named by any Richard
sentence. Hence, this measurement sequence must dif-
fer in at least one measurement from every measurement
sequence that can be computed, and thus, cannot be a
computable sequence.
Again, we may profitably look at this result in terms
of prediction. Then, the programs pi constitute compu-
tations that, given prior knowledge about a system, are
used to predict the outcomes of sequences of measure-
ments. The above result then implies that no knowledge
exists such that we can computably extract every mea-
surement sequence’s outcomes from it.
Note, however, that this result does not imply that
a given measurement’s outcome cannot be computably
produced by itself, but merely that it cannot be pro-
duced in a given sequence of measurements. The same
measurement could occur in a different position in an-
other measurement sequence, where its outcome may be
perfectly computable.
But this is exactly the behavior we expect in quantum
mechanics: for a system in a given state s, it might be
the case that we can perfectly well predict the outcome
of a measurement m. If, however, we find that after ap-
plying some sequence of measurements µ to s, we can
no longer predict m, then this must mean that the sys-
tem is no longer in state s—in other words, as above,
measurements must be capable of changing the state of
a system. A measurement following this state change
then may have an entirely different outcome than one
preceding it, for instance. In this case, the unpredictable
measurement is complementary to (at least one of) the
measurements that have occurred before.
The crux of the above arguments is the existence of
the diagonal map map ∆ : N→ N× N.
Physically, the diagonal map allows the possibility of
cloning, that is, of creating two identical copies of one
and the same system in some state s (recall that a given
measurement sequence may contain the complete infor-
mation of a state; duplicating this information is thus
tantamount to duplicating the state itself). It is inter-
esting to note that this map is not realizable in quantum
mechanical systems, due to the famed no-cloning theorem
[61], which can also be thought of as prohibiting exact
measurement of every state (for if I could measure every
state, I could simply re-prepare it, producing a clone;
and if I could clone every state, I could simply measure
enough copies to enable tomographic reconstruction of
the state).
Interestingly, as noted by Svozil [62], there is another
way quantum mechanics evades the paradoxical construc-
tion. Let us swap the set of classical truth values {0, 1}
for ‘quantum truth values’ |0〉 and |1〉. Then, the ‘nega-
tion operator’
D = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| , (4)
which takes |0〉 to |1〉 and vice versa, cannot fulfill the
role of the negation in the above proof: the equal super-
position
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) (5)
forms a fixed point of the negation operator, yielding
D |+〉 = |+〉. Consequently, the above proof no longer
works—due to the possibility of superposition, the nega-
tion operation no longer is fixed-point free.
Taken together, the results in this section imply that,
as principle (2) stipulates, additional information is al-
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ways available about a system—there exist measure-
ments such that their value, for a certain state, cannot be
predicted computationally from prior knowledge of that
system, and there exist measurement sequences such that
they contain measurements that cannot be predicted for
any state of a system.
IV. MAKING UNDECIDABILITY
QUANTITATIVE
We have so far established that there are outcomes of
measurements on a system S which cannot be predicted,
even given maximal knowledge of the state s of S. Fur-
thermore, we have seen how state change upon measure-
ment is mandated by requirements of consistency, and
how measurements may influence the outcomes of mea-
surements following them, leading to a notion of comple-
mentarity.
However, this is not yet fully quantum-like behavior:
while we can thus always acquire new information about
a system, the characteristically quantum feature is the
loss or invalidation of old information upon such an infor-
mation gain—the more accurately one knows a system’s
position, the less accurate knowledge about its momen-
tum becomes. Moving towards the (epistemic) horizon,
discovering new features of the landscape, entails losing
sight of areas previously in view. The total amount of
information we can gain on a system is bounded, and
any new information gained must obey this bound, thus
mandating information loss.
The question we will be concerned with in the follow-
ing is that of state-space localizability: how well can we
localize S within its state-space ΣS by some sequence of
measurements?
Intuitively, it is clear that localizing a system to an ever
smaller ‘area’ within its state space requires an increasing
amount of information. However, we need to be careful
here: in principle, we may define a measurement that
asks whether the system is within an arbitrarily small
subset of its state space; if this measurement comes out
1, it seems that we have achieved an arbitrarily fine lo-
calization with just a single bit of information.
This, however, is clearly absurd: it is akin to defin-
ing a code in which the entire works of Shakespeare are
mapped to 1, and then concluding that they contain only
one bit of information. We need, rather, to take into
account the information that is needed minimally to de-
scribe a given subset, and thus, a property; this then
yields a better notion of the information gained in a mea-
surement.
Thus, we appeal to the notion of Kolmogorov complex-
ity [63]. Here, the Kolmogorov or algorithmic complex-
ity K(ξ) of a binary string ξ is the length of the shortest
program x [63] producing the string ξ on some universal
machine U , that is
K(ξ) = min
x:U(x)=ξ
|x|, (6)
where |x| denotes the length of the program x. Note that
the admissible programs must be self-delimiting: no pro-
gram x can be valid if it contains another valid program
as initial substring (that is, there must be something akin
to an ‘end’ instruction, terminating bracket, etc.).
It can be shown that the Kolmogorov complexity is
independent of the computing machine U up to a finite
factor that roughly quantifies the program simulating U
on some different computing machine U ′; hence, for ques-
tions only sensitive to the scaling of this complexity, we
can leave the specification of the machine open.
For a given property pi, we can then define its informa-
tion content as K(pi)—that is, the length of the shortest
program that outputs a description of the subset of ΣS
that pi corresponds to.
Consequently, we can encode the localization of S into
a bit string σ, such that n bits of σ suffice to localize
the state within a fraction of 2−n of ΣS . If we can ob-
tain information about S such that we can produce σ to
an arbitrary degree of precision, then we can localize S
arbitrarily well within its state space.
We may think about σ in the following way: first, di-
vide the state space into two equal subspaces (we will
assume a bounded state space for the time being, which
is adequate for any real experiment—for instance, a par-
ticle is somewhere within the lab, and moving slower than
light). If it is found in the right half, the first bit of sigma
is equal to 1, in the left half, it is 0. Then we proceed to
further subdivide the remaining volume, thus yielding a
string σ such that every bit corresponds to a particular
level of a set of nested intervals.
Thus, our question now becomes: Does there exist a
measurement sequence µ such that the associated out-
come sequence µ(s) suffices to compute σ to an arbitrary
degree of precision?
In the following, we will answer this question in the
negative: there exists a fundamental limit to state-space
localizability. To do so, we first note the following: there
exists a bit string σ′ such that finite-length prefixes of σ′
allow the computation of finite-length prefixes of σ, and
σ′ is algorithmically random. We may think about σ′ as
a maximally compressed version of σ.
This follows, because σ is equivalent to some out-
come sequence µ(s), and, as shown above, outcome se-
quences are in general (i.e. with probability 1) uncom-
putable. Hence, by the representation theorem of Edis
[19], there exists an algorithm capable of enumerating
bits of σ (equivalently, outcomes µ(s)) given a certain
random number as an oracle. This random number is σ′.
If we can now establish that only finitely many bits
of σ′ can be computably generated, then likewise only
finitely many bits of σ can be generated from it (as oth-
erwise, σ would be computable, i.e. there exists a finite
program producing infinitely many bits of σ from some
finite prefix of σ′). Consequently, any system can only
be localized to a finite degree within its state space.
An important property of random sequences is their
incompressibility. Intuitively, while a highly regular se-
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quence may admit of a very short description—such as
‘10,000 times 1’—, the description of a random sequence
cannot be significantly shorter than the sequence itself,
as it lacks any regularity that could be exploited to this
end.
Then, an infinite string ξ is random if there exists a
constant c such that for every n-bit prefix of ξ, it holds
that [64, 65]
K(ξn) > n− c. (7)
In accordance with the previous discussion, let σ′ be an
algorithmically random sequence, and let σ|m = C(σ′|n),
with n,m < ∞, for some computation C—i.e. let finite
prefixes of σ be computable from finite prefixes of σ′.
Furthermore, let σ encode some outcome sequence µ(s)
such that σ enables localization of s within ΣS to arbi-
trary precision. Then, only a finite prefix of σ′ can be
produced by some computation, and consequently, only
a finite approximation to σ can be computable.
Intuitively, this means that we can localize S only to a
finite degree, no matter what sequence of measurements
µ we perform; or, understood again epistemically, there
exists no specification of a system’s state that allows ar-
bitrary state-space localizability.
The argument closely follows the method laid out by
Chaitin [66].
The key assumption here is again laid out in the corre-
spondence between physical systems, computations, and
formal systems (see Table II): following this analogy, we
stipulate that the process by which measurement out-
comes are generated is computational. That is, there
exists a program such that it enumerates the outcomes
of every measurement sequence µ; furthermore, since the
bits of σ′ are likewise computed from measurement out-
comes, there must exist some program pσ′ such that it
produces the binary expansion of σ′.
Let us then assume, for contradiction, that infinitely
many bits of σ′ can be generated in a computable way.
Then, there exists a special-purpose computer C and a
program p given by the string
p = 00 . . . 01︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
pσ′x, (8)
such that C, executing p, does the following: first, it
reads the l initial bits, essentially simply telling it the
number l. Then, C executes the program pσ′ , producing
bits of the sequence σ, not necessarily in any particular
order, keeping count of the number r of bits read of pσ′ .
It stops this operation as soon as it has generated r + 2l
bits of σ. That is, effectively, C needs only execute the
program
p′ = 00 . . . 01︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
p
|r
σ′x, (9)
where p
|r
σ′ is that r-bit prefix of pσ′ necessary to generate
r + 2l bits of σ′.
After executing this part of the program, then, C has
generated r + 2l bits of σ′. Let n be the index of the
rightmost bit it has determined; then, C has generated
r + 2l bits of the n-bit prefix σ′|n of σ′.
If the bits that have been generated are not simply the
first n bits of σ′, then there are n−r−2l bits in σ′|n that
have not yet been generated by C. These bits are given
to C as the string x in the above program. Consequently,
the action of C on p′ is
C(p′) = σ′|n; (10)
that is, the program p′ enables C to compute an n-bit
prefix of σ′.
Now, the total length of the program p′ is given by
|p′| = l + r + n− r − 2l = n− l. (11)
This allows us to put an upper bound on the Kol-
mogorov complexity of σ|n of
K(σ′|n) ≤ n− l+ c′, (12)
where c′ is the length of a program simulating C on some
universal machine U , since we know that there exists a
program of length n− l for C computing σ′|n.
The randomness of σ′ now implies that (see Eq. 7)
n− c < K(σ′|n) ≤ n− l+ c′, (13)
which can only hold if l < c+ c′. But l is a free param-
eter in p′; consequently, we can choose l = c + c′, and
reach a contradiction: if we can obtain r + 2l bits of σ′,
then K(σ′|n) ≤ n − c; but this is impossible due to the
randomness of σ′|n. Thus, we can only obtain less than
r + 2l bits of σ′|n.
Consequently, once we have performed enough mea-
surements such that their outcomes suffice to generate
r+2l bits of σ′, further measurements cannot yield addi-
tional information increasing the localizability of S. The
reason for this is that, by the results of Section III, the se-
quence of measurement outcomes localizing s in ΣS must
be uncomputable. But every uncomputable sequence can
be obtained via a computation that has a random string
as an oracle. However, only finite prefixes of algorithmi-
cally random sequences can be generated computation-
ally. Hence, putting this together, any system can only
be located within its state-space up to finite accuracy.
Now, if this bound is attained, there are certainly mea-
surements that ought to be able to increase our knowl-
edge about S, and consequently, help localize it further
within ΣS . The result in the previous section guarantees
as much: there must be a measurement yielding informa-
tion not reducible to that obtained via the sequence of
measurements performed so far.
This situation is comparable to what we find in
Spekkens’ toy theory: having obtained a certain amount
of information, another measurement is in principle pos-
sible which would further increase our knowledge. How-
ever, there exists a bound on this knowledge—given, in
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the case of the toy theory, by the knowledge balance prin-
ciple.
One possibility now would be that the measurement
necessarily fails—that whenever we are in a position to
increase our knowledge beyond the established bounds,
suddenly our equipment malfunctions, or the measure-
ment otherwise does not yield a result. However, this
seems absurd: after all, these experiments are perfectly
feasible, as long as our knowledge remains within the lim-
its. Furthermore, as we have seen, measurements that fail
to produce an outcome do not help to avert the conse-
quences of these arguments.
The other possibility is that the measurements suc-
ceed, and still, the knowledge bounds are not exceeded.
This necessitates, however, that prior information must
become obsolete: that is, that knowledge gathered by
previous measurements no longer applies to the system.
This is now exactly what we find in quantum mechan-
ics: in order not to violate the uncertainty principle, gain-
ing accuracy in our knowledge of, say, a system’s position
entails an equivalent loss of knowledge about its momen-
tum. The volume within which we can maximally localize
a system remains constant; we can at best deform it. We
have already seen that it must be in principle possible for
a measurement to change the state of the system; the re-
sult in this section then imposes a constraint on how this
change occurs—namely, in accordance with the bound on
knowledge that can be attained about a system.
At this point, one might well ask why, if we cannot
localize the system further via computable means, addi-
tional measurement outcomes are not then produced via
noncomputable processes. After all, we have already seen
that the dynamics cannot be fully computational.
The answer to this question was already given in the
previous section: as we saw, it is not consistently possi-
ble to yield such ‘undecidable’ outcomes and remain in
the same state. Consequently, a state change must occur
once we reach the epistemic horizon, such that the mea-
surement outcome we obtain could be derived from the
post-measurement state via computational means. Thus,
the bound is upheld, and we obtain no further localizing
information.
The noncomputational processes thus seem to, in some
sense, cover their tracks, so as to not lead to inconsis-
tency. One might compare this to how, in certain inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics (such as the de Broglie-
Bohm one), faster-than-light influences are barred from
producing causal paradoxes, enabling the ‘peaceful coex-
istence’ [67] of quantum mechanics and special relativity.
This amounts to a proof of the first of the two princi-
ples above: by computational means, we can only obtain
a finite amount of information about the system S, suf-
ficient to localize it in its state space to within a finite
smallest volume.
Note that this is not necessarily a restriction on the
knowability of a system’s state. One might hold—against
the definition of state given above—that a valid and com-
plete state of a system is not obliged to yield definite
values for every conceivable measurement. Indeed, ac-
cording to views of the quantum state that grant it ontic
status, this is exactly the case in quantum mechanics.
In such a case, the state of the system can be perfectly
known—however, this state itself does not perfectly lo-
calize the system within its state space.
V. CONCLUSION
Special relativity can be obtained from constraints on
the capacities of observers to perform certain measure-
ments. Already Bohr noted a kinship to quantum me-
chanics in this regard [68]:
The impossibility of an unambiguous sep-
aration between space and time without refer-
ence to the observer, and the impossibility of
a sharp separation between the behaviour of
objects and their interaction with the means
of observation are, in fact, straightforward
consequences of the existence of a maximum
velocity of propagation of all actions and of a
minimum quantity of any action, respectively.
Einstein’s thought experiments placed the observer’s
instruments within the purview of the physics they
sought to describe, forcing them to work with real clocks
and rulers, subject to limitations such as the finiteness of
the speed of light.
Our arguments can be read in the same operational
spirit. Limitations exist for measurement apparatuses
precisely due to their being embedded within the same
physical context as the systems they observe. Just as the
constraints of special relativity imply the impossibility
of a universal standard of simultaneity and the nonexis-
tence of an absolute length scale, leading to the observ-
able phenomena of time dilation and length contraction,
our results imply restrictions on the amount of knowl-
edge available about an object system, leading to many
of the phenomena of quantum mechanics (as detailed in
the various reconstructions [3–9]).
We thus started our investigation by noting the role
of two postulates, a postulate of finite information and
a postulate of additional information, in derivations of
the formalism of quantum mechanics. We identified self-
reference, or, more accurately, the undecidability of cer-
tain measurement outcomes due to self-reference, as a
common thread behind these postulates. Thus, the sec-
ond postulate was derived as the impossibility of predict-
ing all possible measurement outcome sequences from the
knowledge of a system’s state in Section III, and the first
postulate as the impossibility of localizing a system in
its state space to arbitrary accuracy in Section IV. As a
consequence, the classical ideal of perfect knowledge and
predictivity is as unachievable as Hilbert’s dream of find-
ing a single, finite axiomatization of all of mathematics.
This provides an example of what Svozil [69] has
termed the ‘third path’ in dealing with the limits of
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knowledge as imposed by physical or logical constraints:
rather than excluding them as mere ‘artifacts’ or, at
the opposite end, assuming a stance of defeatism to-
wards such unknowables, one ought to instead investigate
their implications towards theory building in a system-
atic manner.
Hence, in any theory meeting the requirements of these
proofs—that is, any theory which allows for the instan-
tiation of the maps used in the proofs by means of some
physical process—, these ‘postulates’ need not be postu-
lated at all; rather, they come ‘for free’, and with them,
all the quantum effects that they entail. In particular,
this includes classical mechanics: since it allows for uni-
versal computation, and for the in-principle arbitrary de-
termination of system states, all of the maps used can be
instantiated. But then, quantum mechanics (or at least,
those elements of it entailed by the epistemic horizons)
is not separate from classical mechanics after all; rather,
it is merely the consistent completion of the former in
regimes where the theory would otherwise lead to para-
doxical self-reference.
In the same sense, special relativity is the consistent
completion of Newtonian mechanics in regimes of veloc-
ities comparable to that of light: just as we find novel
observable phenomena when approaching this universal
speed limit, novel phenomena manifest themselves when
we attempt to achieve perfect knowledge of the state of
an object system. In both cases, the classical formalism
becomes deformed—in the mathematical sense—by the
presence of an invariant parameter. Just as we do not
ordinarily move at velocities comparable to that of light,
we do not ordinarily have even close to full knowledge of
the state of any given object—think of the myriad ways
in which the atoms of your desk could be arranged, with-
out you noticing the slightest difference. Thus, it is only
in the regimes where we are in a position to obtain close
to maximal knowledge of a given system’s state—which
typically correspond to very tightly controlled systems
of few microscopic constituents—that the deformation’s
effects become observable.
This opens up a new avenue of investigation into
Wheeler’s perennial question for the origins of quantum
mechanics. As we have seen, Wheeler himself at times
pursued the same path. Following it thus seems to hold
great potential for answering otherwise difficult questions
about quantum mechanics.
We have shown that, in general, there are always mea-
surement outcomes that cannot be predicted; moreover,
there are properties such that a system in a certain state
can neither be said to possess nor not to possess them,
mirroring the phenomenon of superposition.
Furthermore, whether these outcomes can be predicted
depends on the sequence of measurements that have al-
ready been performed. Thus, a given measurement might
be perfectly predictable in one sequence—within one
measurement context—yet become unpredictable in an-
other. This yields the central quantum phenomenon of
complementarity: certain measurements may influence
the value of subsequently performed ones. Moreover, we
see how measurement necessarily affects the state of a
system.
Finally, the impossibility of localizing a system to an
arbitrary degree within its state space yields the uncer-
tainty principle: there exists a fixed maximum knowledge
that can be extracted about a system’s state.
We thus approach quantum phenomena from two dif-
ferent angles: one, we have seen how the limitations im-
posed upon measurement by the arguments given above
can serve as a justification of the epistemic horizons em-
ployed as foundational principles for quantum mechanics
in various reconstructions; and two, we gave explicit ex-
amples of how phenomena closely paralleling the quan-
tum phenomena of superposition, complementarity, and
the uncertainty principle emerge directly from these re-
strictions.
Nevertheless, I do not claim to have achieved a re-
construction of the full quantum formalism. While the
above results appear very suggestive, it remains to be
seen whether the entirety of quantum phenomena can be
derived from these considerations.
Should this be the case, however, there emerges a pic-
ture of quantum evolution that is overall uncomputable,
but can, as in Edis’ representation theorem, be decom-
posed into a deterministic and a random part—the ran-
domness taking over whenever knowledge about the sys-
tem’s state reaches the epistemic horizon.
Such a ‘hypercomputational interpretation’ has in-
triguing consequences for the measurement problem.
Usually, this is stated as the discrepancy between von
Neumann’s ‘process I’ and ‘process II’, the discontinu-
ous ‘collapse’ of the wave function to an eigenstate of
the measurement operator and the deterministic, unitary
Schro¨dinger dynamics, respectively [70]. The present pic-
ture naturally leads to such a two-tiered dynamics: when-
ever we would otherwise exceed the epistemic boundaries,
randomness takes over.
But this two-tieredness is ultimately merely apparent:
in the end, there exists only a single physical evolution,
which, however, cannot be computable. Nevertheless,
any observer having a certain amount of information
about a system—and thus, being appropriately corre-
lated with it—will be forced to model this dynamics as
a certain random event. In this sense, the present view
is inherently relational : whether smooth Schro¨dinger or
discontinuous measurement dynamics have to be applied
depends on the information one system has about an-
other.
Thus, the study of the role of undecidability and self-
reference in the foundations of quantum mechanics seems
a promising route for future research. One interesting
possibility is that, in certain cases, undecidability ap-
pears to be a resource that can be used to outperform
classical capacities: Van den Nest and Briegel have shown
that, in the setting of measurement-based quantum com-
putation, a quantum state yields a speedup whenever the
logic derived from the graph representing the state is un-
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decidable [71].
The method of proof used in arriving at our results
derives from a fixed-point theorem due to Lawvere [49].
The specific setting of Lawvere’s theorem is that of
Cartesian closed categories, whose most prominent rep-
resentative is the category Set. The critical feature of
these categories that enables the proof of this theorem
is the existence of a diagonal map ∆. Basically, this
map enables the copying of information, in our case of
the outcome sequence obtained by applying a sequence
of measurements to a state (which, in a classical world,
is equivalent to the state itself).
This is, of course, an operation that is expressly forbid-
den in quantum mechanics—the cloning of information,
or copying of quantum states [61], respectively the possi-
bility of perfect state discrimination. As Baez [72] notes,
one of the features that distinguishes the category Hilb,
whose objects are Hilbert spaces and whose morphisms
are given by linear operators, from Set is in fact the ab-
sence of such a cloning operation, due to the fact that
it is not Cartesian closed. Indeed, as he and Stay sug-
gest [73], ‘Cartesian’ can be taken to be the antonym of
‘quantum’ in the category theoretical setting.
A possible implication of this is then that quantum the-
ory appears strange and in need of ‘interpretation’ to us
only because of this ‘categorical mismatch’, trying to ap-
ply the logic of sets to objects that are not well described
in this way. At first, it seems to remain mysterious why
we would do so, however. Baez [72] suggests that this
may be the case because the objects of our everyday ex-
perience seem to be well approximated as ‘elements of
sets’. But this is itself a fact in need of explanation.
A different suggestion might be that this is precisely
due to the fact that Cartesian closed categories, unlike
Hilb, allow for the copying of information. That this is
a feature essential to our apprehension of the world be-
comes clear if we consider that without it, communication
in the everyday sense is impossible: such communication
has only taken place if afterwards all involved parties
possess the same information. Thus, in one way or an-
other, this feature is present in everything that we can
talk about, write about, or even reason about; hence, it is
impressed on the way we grasp the world, and underlies
every model we construct of it.
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